In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Scramble for Africa saw many of the world’s great powers vying to expand their empires and thus broaden their spheres of influence across the globe. The continent was divided up for resources by European powers, but this proved to be a short-lived prelude to a much more subtle and enduring form of control. As time passed and mass decolonisation occurred in the mid-20th century, great power influence in the African continent and beyond took a new form. The Cold War highlighted the desire of the world’s two most influential states, the US and USSR, to spread their respective power bases across the world. Many states which may not have otherwise played a significant role in global politics found themselves thrust into conflict, often in the form of civil wars between domestic belligerents who were backed by the two significant forces of the 20th century. This reality of great power contestation for influence (particularly over the Global South) is one which has consistently reared its head in international relations since the advent of globalisation. Accepting this as an inescapable truth of geopolitics, several key questions arise; which region will emerge as the next epicenter for ideological expansion and subsequent great power conflict? What are the stakes and consequences that are yet to be observed?
In conversation with the Council on Foreign Relations, the US National Security Adviser, Jake Sullivan, reflects on the fundamental basis of US policy towards China:
“We determined that the PRC was the only state with both the intent to reshape the international order and the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to do it.”[1]
Ideologically opposed, the US and China have long been locked in what is widely regarded as a new Cold War. The diplomatic standoff has been illustrated in instances such as President Trump’s hyper-protectionist economic policy and the ensuing trade war, as well as tensions over US-aligned Taiwan, regarded by President Xi as a renegade province of the People’s Republic of China. With no indication of a regression of hostilities between the world’s first and second strongest military powers, security has become the primary concern of not only the two states, but also those whose safety may be compromised as a result of conflict of any sort between the two.
Much like the Cold War of the 20th century, a key facet of this era-defining ideological conflict is that external regions and third-party states have become theaters of tension via proxy. If history is to repeat itself - as it often does - it will be these particular nations (rather than the US and China along with their most prominent allies) who will be impacted most by the consequences of this conflict. This reality is particularly true for nations which are comparatively small and underdeveloped both territorially and in terms of global influence. Home to many such island nations, the South Pacific has emerged somewhat unnoticed as the landscape for this diplomatic struggle in recent years.
As the dominant neighboring power of these Pacific islands, Australia, like the US, views its regional objectives as bringing these nations into alignment with the pro-Western democratic sphere. The Australian government’s recent increased focus on forging and preserving relationships with its island neighbors appears to signal the arrival of this conflict on Australia’s doorstep. National Affairs Editor James Massola suggests that the three main foreign policy objectives of the Albanese government are “repairing our relations in the South Pacific, building our relations in Southeast Asia [and] repairing – thawing – our relations with Beijing.”[2] Overwhelmingly, each pillar of this approach factors in a great degree of Chinese influence with which the Australian government must contend.
Geographically isolated, relatively small and with a population of just over 11,000 people,[3] Tuvalu has not been a major player in global affairs, and in fact consistently ranks among the least visited countries globally each year[4]. Yet, as history teaches the student of international relations, a nation’s place in a great power conflict is often precisely due to a historic lack of global presence or prominent historical alignment with global powers. Formerly known as the Ellice Islands, a British protectorate from 1916-75, Tuvalu has remained aligned with the United Kingdom, as well as other notable powers including the United States, Australia, Japan and South Korea. Tuvalu’s diplomatic relationship with Taiwan is also of significance regarding the ideological tensions between China and the US and its allies; being one of just 3 Pacific nations and 11 others across the globe to maintain diplomatic ties with Taiwan.
The Falepili Union, reached between Australian Prime Minister Albanese and then-Tuvaluan Prime Minister Kausea Natano of Tuvalu in November of 2023, is broadly representative of Australia’s aim of building relationships in the South Pacific based on strategic interests. In Tuvaluan, ‘falepili’ refers to neighbors who live close together and connotes a mutually upheld duty of care, protection and sharing.[5] Climate diplomacy is high on the list of priorities particularly on the Tuvaluan side of the bilateral negotiations, emerging from concerns over rising sea levels. In September of 2023, only a few months before the signing of the Falepili Union treaty, the government constitutionally enshrined the notion that Tuvalu would retain its statehood in the event of loss of its physical territory. This concept is unprecedented in international law, however will likely become a key concern of other island nations in the South Pacific in the coming years due to the same challenge. Understanding Tuvalu’s climate anxieties, the Australian government has pledged $16.9 million to the Tuvalu Coastal Adaptation Project – an initiative to expand the country’s coastline – as well as the creation of a mobility scheme for citizens from Tuvalu to migrate to Australia. The most notable compromise concerns Article 4, which pertains to security and stability cooperation. This article dictates the mutual agreement with the Australian government in “any partnership, arrangement or engagement with any other State or entity on security and defense-related matters.”[5] In the context of the broader conflict, this is a measure which seeks to ensure that Tuvalu remains in lockstep with Australian security policy and is not enticed by any future external propositions which may undermine it. This move is seen by Australia as a necessary countermeasure to China’s own diplomatic courting of Pacific states such as the Solomon Islands; an archipelago roughly 1,700km from Cairns with whom China signed a security agreement in April 2022.
However, the Falepili Union has not gone uncriticised, particularly following the election of Prime Minister Feleti Teo in Tuvalu in February of this year. Teo – himself an architect of the union – has since raised concerns regarding the extent to which it will allow Australia to dictate Tuvalu’s security policy and undermine its sovereignty. While further consensus has since been reached and a path to ratification of the treaty is being taken, it is likely that similar concerns will emerge from Pacific Island nations who are in comparably weak bargaining positions relative to Australia. While acknowledging its role as the more influential partner in such negotiations, the Australian government must continue to balance its desire for a secure region with a recognition of the individual national interests of its neighbors.
Faced with the reality of Chinese influence moving further and further southwards, it will become increasingly necessary for the Australian government to replicate its landmark agreement with other states in its proximity who find themselves similarly placed to Tuvalu. The Albanese government’s prioritisation of South Pacific diplomacy suggests a growth of Australia’s influence in this global conflict. More broadly, the approach to tackling the onset of climate change as well as the upholding of state sovereignty and security remain impacted by the implications of the great power divide, and centrally inform the foreign policy of states on the periphery.
References
[1] Sullivan, J. (2024, January 30). The Future of U.S.-China Relations.
[2] Massola, J. (2024, May 24). Who really runs the country? The Brisbane Times. TikTok
[3] World Population Review (2024). https://worldpopulationreview.com/.
[4] UN Tourism (2024). https://www.unwto.org/tourism-data/global-and-regional-tourism-performance.
[5] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2023, November 9). Australia-Tuvalu Falepili Union. https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/tuvalu/australia-tuvalu-falepili-union.
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